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Abstract. In inter-enterprise collaborations, autonomous services from
different organizations must independently determine which other ser-
vices they can rely on. Reputation-based trust management in Pilarcos
utilizes shared experience information on the actors’ past behaviour in
estimating the risks of a collaboration; these experiences are shared be-
tween members of the service ecosystem through a reputation system.
As the reputation system becomes an essential peer-control mechanism
for the open service ecosystem, it must be augmented with sanctions for
misbehaviour and appropriate incentives for correct behaviour. A fair
sanctioning system cannot be built on traditional subjective reports, as
rebuttal of undeserved reports requires shared, objective measures. To
make the shared experience information objective and verifiable, we as-
sociate it with whether the relevant collaboration contract was followed,
backed up with evidence in the form of nonrepudiable receipts. In this
way, we are able to protect automated reputation-based trust decisions
from being skewed by misinformation.
1 Introduction
In inter-enterprise collaborations, services from different organizations and do-
mains join together to fulfil a mutual goal. In the open service ecosystem, the
services are autonomous, and there is no centralized control of the collabora-
tion process. Each service must independently determine which other services it
should collaborate with; a trust decision is made to determine this willingness to
rely on another service. The Pilarcos inter-enterprise collaboration management
infrastructure [9, 8] contains a trust management system to automate these deci-
sions in routine cases [17]; selected difficult or high-stake decisions are forwarded
to a human user based on policy-defined rules [6].
A central element of the trust decisions is an estimation of the risk of collab-
orating with the given actor. The estimate is based on gathered experiences on
the actor’s past behaviour, which consists of both first-hand experiences from
earlier collaborations with it, and shared experiences from third parties received
through a reputation system.
2A reputation system has two tasks. First, from the enterprise perspective, it
provides information to support trust decisions for each individual service; this
helps the participants in the reputation system to find new partners and to steer
clear of misbehaving services in order to limit their risk.
Second, from the ecosystem perspective, it introduces a form of peer con-
trol where misbehaviour towards other actors or the ecosystem infrastructure
is punished through reputation loss. Sociological research indicates that direct
first-order punishment for misbehaviour is not enough by itself to ensure that the
ecosystem can scale up in size: it must be complemented with a second-order pun-
ishment to discourage unfair first-order punishments [3]. In other words, spread-
ing false experiences must have a negative reputation impact on the source.
To contrast these requirements to current solutions, systems sharing repu-
tation information are occasionally also considered as subjective recommender
systems on other users; with such an approach, the aim is to promote commonly
liked services rather than implement robust peer-based control. For a recommen-
dation system, experiences are accepted as subjective reports on the fulfilment
of expectations. As different expectations can lead to different reports even on
identical behaviour, these reports do not objectively describe actual outcomes in
the sense that reports on breaches of contract do. While they can still support
individual decision-making as indicators of popularity, the subjectivity of the cri-
teria in use makes recommender systems unsuitable for social control. Solutions
have been proposed to promote similar understanding of the recommendation
values [5, 2]; however, shared semantics do not yet change the fact that the actors
involved are stating their opinions, which cannot be used as a basis of judging
whether a statement is unfair. As an extreme example, two honest actors may
judge a musician’s performance completely differently based on their tastes, due
to a lack of objective measurement scale for what is “good music”. To get around
this ambiguity, we propose to monitor for and report objectively defined events:
explicit breaches of collaboration contracts.
The core problems of unverifiability and subjectivity of experiences in current
approaches hinder the use of reputation information in inter-enterprise collabo-
rations, particularly for automated decision-making. Falsely accused actors must
be able to rebut reports to clear their name, while honest reporters should be
protected from retaliatory action, and the reciprocity of feedback [16] limited.
We advance a reputation system based on objective, verifiable experiences.
It is designed to support automated trust decisions on inter-enterprise collab-
orations, and implements peer control in the service ecosystem by supporting
second-order punishment: a successful rebuttal of a false experience causes repu-
tation loss for the dishonest information source. This is achieved by introducing
a nonrepudiable audit trail to collaborations, and defining reputation impacts of
misbehaviour in collaboration contracts. Similarly, negative reputation impacts
for misreporting are defined in a reputation network contract. The solution ex-
tends the existing Pilarcos collaboration management infrastructure [9, 17].
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents the Pilarcos
ecosystem we build on, and related work. Section 3 maps evidence to reputation
3impacts through collaboration contracts to achieve objectivity, and specifies the
process of creating new reputation information in which unverifiable experiences
can be rebutted and removed from the system. Section 4 discusses the impact
of the solution and compares it to the state of the art.
2 Background and related work
In the first subsection, we summarize the existing Pilarcos open service ecosys-
tem, in which we utilize reputation for trust management. The second subsection
presents related work on the topic of objective and verifiable experiences.
2.1 Reputation-based trust management in Pilarcos
The Pilarcos collaboration management infrastructure provides support for part-
ner discovery, interoperability management, contract negotiations, runtime mon-
itoring, including contract breach detection and recovery, as well as local trust de-
cisions evaluating the actors’ willingness to collaborate with their potential part-
ners [9, 17]. The Pilarcos service ecosystem is collaboratively governed, rather
than centrally controlled, to ensure its long-term viability and scalability [19].
We propose to strengthen the implemented reputation-based trust manage-
ment system in Pilarcos [17] by providing it with a flow of objective and verifiable
reputation information. The trust management system is modular, and can take
advantage of different kinds of reputation systems as its information sources. It
splits experience information into four dimensions: monetary, reputation, control
and satisfaction. This allows risk evaluations to differentiate between e.g. mis-
behaviour that directly causes monetary loss, deterioration of own reputation
caused by a partner spreading fraudulent reports afterwards, weakening of peer
control due to an actor’s misbehaviour as a recommender, and failures to sat-
isfy the demands set in contracts, which may or may not have direct monetary
consequences, respectively [17].
Collaboration contracts, or eContracts, are based on business network mod-
els that specify the structure and business processes of the collaboration, and
relevant trust decision points [8, 17]. These models are modular, reusable and
public, and they are produced by domain experts in response to the needs of
the ecosystem. During contract negotiations, open options in the models, such
as particular quality of service requirements or the price of the service, can be
further refined to form an agreement between the participants [7].
The trust management process can be divided into two parts: the trust deci-
sions, and the evolution process of the reputation information. Both are governed
by their own policies. A trust decision is triggered at specific points of the col-
laboration process, as further resources are committed and an up-to-date risk
evaluation is needed. To evaluate the risk of proceeding with the collaboration,
we predict the outcome it would have on different assets based on previous ex-
periences, which are stored as reputation information; the details of the format
are described in earlier work [17]. In this paper, we focus on the evolution of
reputation information through sharing experiences in a reputation system.
42.2 Related work to support objective and verifiable experiences
We distinguish three approaches for collecting experiences in a way that members
in the service ecosystem can agree on their content: centrally orchestrated, fully
distributed and a protocol-based approach utilizing third-party witnesses.
TrustCoM [22] represents the centrally orchestrated approach. In TrustCoM,
performance monitors both internal and external to the actors collect informa-
tion pertinent to fulfilling the Service Level Agreement (SLA), such as response
times. The monitors send these raw observations to an SLA Evaluator, which
is a third party trusted to pass a neutral judgement on the transacting parties.
This result is, in turn, reported to a trusted third party reputation system, or
used as a basis of removing a partner from the collaboration. The approach fol-
lows a tradition set by centralized workflow execution, such as implemented by
CrossWork [12]. It involves a trusted infrastructure service or a hub member of
the ecosystem running a distributed business process by using the other partic-
ipants as components. This central operator can judge the performance of the
other actors, and decide on sanctions directly. The main difference in operational
environments is that in Pilarcos, control and monitoring are distributed among
the autonomous and not fully trusted participants. As a result, there are no
actors that are able to observe all collaborations in the ecosystem.
In the fully distributed approach (e.g. TrustGuard [20]), the transacting par-
ties exchange nonrepudiable, i.e. cryptographically signed, receipts that act as
evidence of their actions later. The main challenge in this approach is in the
asymmetry of receipts: the party responsible for signing the last receipt can refuse
to finish the protocol, which leaves a hole in the audit trail of evidence [13]. In
TrustGuard, receipts document the intention to collaborate, which means that
the service is not provided before the protocol has been completed. This scheme
protects against submitting experiences of transactions that were never really
started, but cannot stop unfair reports from being made after the transaction.
In the protocol-based approach (e.g. Li, Martin and Zhang [11]), a third
party witness is included in transactions, observing them and implementing a
fair, “atomic” exchange [13]. The proposal of Li et al. aims to secure an elec-
tronic marketplace, which can host a simple form of inter-enterprise collaboration
where goods are exchanged in brief, fixed transactions. It involves an arbitrator,
who acts as a witness and judge of a collaboration, and punishes misbehaviour
through withdrawals on a monetary deposit that all participants have made be-
forehand in a trusted bank. In addition, the arbitrator can report experiences
to a reputation system. When the arbitrator is not needed to resolve a dis-
agreement, a central broker service reports a default positive experience once a
specified time has passed since it matched the two actors [11].
Li et al. implement a centralized punishment system on top of the fair receipt
exchange protocol, which is where they differ from Pilarcos. Our aim in this paper
is to distribute punishment as peer-based control, while taking advantage of the
third party witness approach to provide a stream of verifiable evidence on the
outcomes of transactions in the collaborations.
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judgement, we denote the former as notaries: a notary’s task is to verify with its
own signature whether a protocol was followed according to the specification it
has been given by the transacting partners. The notary must be trusted by the
given partners to remain impartial on that exchange to eliminate asymmetry,
and their agreement on a given notary must be nonrepudiable once the transac-
tion begins. On the other hand, a specific notary does not necessarily need to be
trusted by anyone else in the collaboration or the entire ecosystem, as each in-
dependent exchange can be observed by a different notary. This limits the power
that any specific notary service can gain over the actors in the marketplace.
As a related branch, certification-based trust also relies on cryptographical
verifiability, but should not be confused with the proposed approach of signed
receipts. Certification-based trust is used in e.g. NICE [10]. Instead of being
experience-based, the system relies on signed expressions of “I, Alice, trust Bob”,
and trust decisions are based on policies on whether a provided set of trust
declarations, or certificates, are sufficient to make the decision-maker also trust
the considered target. Other examples of certification-based trust used for access
control include WS-TRUST [14] and KeyNote [1]. Misinformation is a relatively
minor issue for these systems, as the group of accepted information sources is
small, closed and managed oﬄine: certificates document networks of pre-formed
trust relationships between the sources rather than guiding their evolution.
In summary, related work shows that signed, nonrepudiable receipts provide
a promising basis for the verifiability of experiences in open service ecosystems.
We have found that third party witnesses, notaries, are needed to guarantee the
fair exchange of receipts on the transaction, and that the concept has already
been applied within electronic markets.
In the following section, we apply the solution to provide a basis for objective
and verifiable reputation information in the open service ecosystem by first pro-
viding a mapping between the receipt evidence and the corresponding experience
stored in a reputation system through contracts, then specifying a process for
creation of new reputation information that allows experiences not backed by
appropriate evidence to be rebutted and removed from the reputation system.
3 Sharing and rebuttal of new experiences
In order to make reputation information objective, it must be defined so that
it has a measurable truth value, rather than as a subjective opinion. In this
section, we define the basis for objective experiences, and specify the process
for submitting them into the reputation system as well as for rebuting false
experiences.
For inter-enterprise collaborations, objective experience sharing is made fea-
sible by electronic contracts governing the collaborations: if the contract was
followed, experiences should be positive; if it was violated, they should be neg-
ative. From the perspective of a single service, the impact of a specific outcome
may vary from minor to major gain or loss [17], but in order to make the shared
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through the contract as well. A natural source for this information is the busi-
ness network model referenced by the contract. The business network model is a
formal model for the collaboration and defines e.g. the communication protocols
and compensation processes involved [9].
Determining the reputation effect of different outcomes becomes a part of the
modelling process done by the domain expert, which makes the mapping reusable
over multiple collaboration instances using the same model. The modelled values
can be further fine-tuned in the contract negotiations, in case the same model
can be used for collaborations dealing with very different stakes.
The collaboration contract, then, should specify a mapping of outcomes to
experiences, for example that the event “goods received” should translate to
an experience with major positive effect on the monetary and satisfaction as-
sets, and no effect on the control and reputation assets [17]. In this example,
the party receiving the goods (A) will submit this experience on the party who
sent them (B). In order to support verifiability, it also produces a signed, non-
repudiable receipt of the outcome of the step. The example communication pro-
tocol and the following experience submission process are depicted in Figure 1.
Fig. 1. An example collaboration protocol and submission of an experience report.
The receipts, depicted in Figure 2, remain private unless they are used to
rebut an experience, and they are stored by both collaborators. The source ac-
tor (A) is the provider of the receipt. The target actor (B) is the actor for whom
the receipt is generated. The notary witnesses the transaction step when the
protocol in the collaboration model so defines. In the optimistic fair exchange
protocol [13], collaborators can choose to only involve the notary if one party fails
to respond on time. This requires that the relevant exchange can be repeated
with the notary listening in as needed, but it should significantly reduce the
communication overhead: the threat of notary involvement removes the attrac-
tiveness of receipt omissions almost as effectively as the observation itself [13].
7– Source actor id, target actor id
– Notary id
– Business network model id, eContract id, task id
– Task counter, receipt protocol step
– Outcome of step (e.g. “goods received”)
– Signature of witness (source or notary)
Fig. 2. The contents of a receipt.
The model and task information together provide a reference for determining
the reputation impact represented by the receipt, and a unique identifier for the
receipt (and corresponding experience) in case the same task is repeated multiple
times. Each task can be expected to produce several receipts on relevant steps,
most notably its start and end, and this is captured by the step identifier. The
outcome of the step is the identifier of the given outcome as defined in the
contract. The eventual signature of the witness depends on whether the exchange
was notarized or not.
The notary only sends out receipts, and does not store them; it does not
participate in the reputation system process afterwards.
Experience reports, depicted in Figure 3, are submitted to the reputation
system by the source about the target, corresponding to the relevant receipts.
The identifiers of the actors are as above. Although the main relevance of the
notary is in the receipt phase, it is provided in the experience report in order
to support credibility analysis: not all of the reputation system participants
are required to consider all available notaries trustworthy. When identifying the
transaction, the protocol step mentioned in the receipt is omitted here — the
single task produces one experience per actor (possibly on both participants in
the transaction), but there are multiple receipts that can be used as evidence on
a single experience depending on how the transaction progressed. The signature
of the source ensures that the experience report cannot be faked: this is required,
as submitting a false report that is successfully rebutted has a reputation impact.
– Source actor id, target actor id
– Notary id, if applicable
– Business network model id, eContract id, task id, task counter
– Signature of the source
– Timestamp (time of submission)
Fig. 3. The contents of an experience report.
The timestamp here is set by the reputation system when it receives the
report for dissemination. It is used to limit the time frame in which rebuttals
must be made. Once the time has passed, the source and target are free to
dispose of the receipts connected with the experience. In addition, the experi-
8ence can then be incorporated into a permanent storage, e.g. transformed into
counter increments or similar compound formats that are no longer individually
processable.
A rebuttal, depicted in Figure 4, is typically made by the target of the expe-
rience to clear its name, as the source has produced the experience to submit.
In the case of whitewashing, i.e. undeserved positive experiences, a third party
can decide to rebut the experience as well.
– Source id, target id, rebutter id
– Business network model id, eContract id, task id, task counter
– Type of rebuttal: 1) Target rebuttal of false (negative) experience, 2) target not-
ing a failure to report (positive) experience, or 3) target or third party rebuttal
to (negative or positive) experience on a nonexistent transaction
– Evidence in form of signed receipts, as applicable
– Signature of the rebutter
– Timestamp (time of rebuttal)
Fig. 4. The contents of a rebuttal.
The source and target id refer to their equivalents in the experience, while
the rebutter id is either the target’s or belongs to a third party whistleblower.
The second line identifies the experience being rebutted. The type of rebuttal
specifies which kind of response is expected:
For the first type, the target rebutting a (typically negative) experience, the
rebutter (i.e. target) must provide any available reciepts proving it has followed
the transaction according to contract. If the target’s case is sufficient, the source
suffers a reputation loss and the experience is removed. If its evidence does not
fulfil the requirements of the rebuttal type and protocol, the rebuttal is ineffec-
tive. The verification of the evidence can be done centrally by the reputation
system; in case the reputation system cannot be sufficiently trusted to follow
this protocol fairly, the rebuttals and supporting evidence can be distributed to
all the nodes to perform the rebuttal process locally. This choice ties to how
information dissemination is organized in the reputation system in general, and
is not forced either way by the model of how rebuttals work.
With the second type of rebuttal, the target notifies that the source should
have reported a (typically positive) experience on it, but has not. The target,
again, must provide the evidence to support its claim. This type forms a special
case in defining the appropriate time for the rebuttal: the source should submit
the experience without delay after it has provided the target with sufficient evi-
dence, yet we cannot trust a timestamp in the receipt, as it can be set arbitrarily
by the source. Instead, the fact that the target is able to present the evidence
in the first place indicates that the experience should either be in the system or
arriving simultaneously with the rebuttal. If this is not the case and the evidence
from the receipts is sufficient, the source suffers negative reputation.
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the original experience. The target may rebut an experience, typically negative,
of a transaction that never happened, or a third-party whistleblower may rebut
it, suspecting an undeserved, typically positive experience. In both cases, the
burden of proving that the transaction exists and ended as indicated by the
experience lies with the source, and if it fails, it suffers a negative reputation
impact. The relevant evidence consists of receipts signed by the target or a
notary; receipts signed by the source alone are no more credible than the original
signed experience report. In the case of the third party rebuttal, it is worth
noting that the evidence may itself be a product of collusion between the source
and target, in which case the rebuttal may have been appropriate but is still
ineffective. The contents of the rebuttal response are depicted in Figure 5.
– Source id, target id, rebutter id
– Business network model id, eContract id, task id, task counter
– Evidence in form of signed receipts
Fig. 5. The contents of a rebuttal response.
The rebuttal response can go unsigned, as the signatures of the receipts
define its validity. It only needs to be identified as a continuation of the rebuttal
before it, and provide the valid evidence. Its arrival time can be compared to the
timestamp on the rebuttal, but it has no particular need for a timestamp itself:
either it arrives on time to be accepted into the reputation system or it does not.
A failure to respond adequately means the original rebuttal is accepted, while a
successful response cancels out the rebuttal and the experience remains valid.
4 The impact of objective and verifiable experiences
We have defined an objective basis for experiences through associating them
with contracts. This gives shared experiences the semantic clarity required to
use them in automated decision-making. To ensure the verifiability of experi-
ences, we enforce the fairness of the receipt exchange protocols through the use
of notaries. Together, objectivity and verifiability provide a basis for using rep-
utation information to implement social control in the open service ecosystems.
Obreiter discusses different types of nonrepudiable evidence and problems
related to them [15]. Two issues in particular must be solved to ensure the
acceptability of reputation systems for inter-enterprise collaborations:
– Actors have very limited incentive to provide any evidence of their own
misbehaviour, while they may have an incentive to provide unfairly negative
reports of their competitors to gain a competitive advantage.
– Two colluding actors can provide an unlimited amount of positive feedback
on each other by faking transactions.
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We first show how our proposal addresses the first issue by providing the
participants appropriate incentives to ensure fair reporting of misbehaviour, and
then focus on addressing the second issue through limiting the negative effects
of ballot stuffing to other members of the ecosystem. In the third subsection, we
compare our work to the state of the art to delineate our contribution.
4.1 Ensuring fair reporting on existing transactions
The protocol design for experience reporting and rebuttal aims to reduce the
need for rebuttals, limit the incentive for false reporting and omissions by making
inaccuracies easier to detect by interested parties, and to balance between giving
incentive for third party whistleblowers to rebut likely inaccurate reports, but
not to flood the system.
To limit fraudulent positive reports that do not result from collusion, we have
chosen the source of a relevant receipt to be the one to submit the related experi-
ence to the reputation system. Positive experiences are assumed to be the norm.
The target of an experience has motivation to ensure that any deserved posi-
tive experiences are reported, possibly also to produce false positive experiences
and omit negative experiences. The source, in turn, has motivation to punish
the target with honest negative experiences, possibly to report false negatives
as well, and omit positive experiences, particularly if the target is a competitor.
The target has an interest to report an omission of a positive experience or to
clear its name after a false negative experience, and it will know to do this if the
reputation system fails to send an expected kind of notification of a reported
experience after a transaction. On the other hand, the production of positive
experiences about nonexistent transactions with the claimed source requires the
source to be around to react to them on time, or a third party whistleblower to
take interest; our design sets the source as the reporter to eliminate this issue.
The three types of rebuttals have different motivations and effects. Our goal
is to punish false experience reports. To achieve objectivity in this, the exact
reputation effects of spreading misinformation are defined in a reputation net-
work contract that must be signed before joining the reputation network. This
contract specifies other relevant factors, such as the exact timeframes for rebut-
tals and their responses, as well. To make the punishment system effective, the
rebutters must have an incentive to submit correct rebuttals, and to not submit
ungrounded rebuttals.
Actors have a reputation-based incentive to rebut unfairly negative experi-
ences towards themselves. In all cases, the correct or missing experience can be
added into the reputation system as a result of a successful rebuttal, in addition
to the incorrect experience being removed or marked as invalid. This new ex-
perience can be signed by the target, or the centralized reputation system that
verifies the evidence, if the latter is available. The target rebutter, in other words,
typically gains positive experience as a result, which creates an incentive for it
to rebut an experience correctly. Unsuccessful target rebutters can be punished
with a negative reputation effect, as they are in a good position to estimate
whether they or the source have the evidence to back or counter a rebuttal.
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Punishing or awarding third party whistleblowers for their rebuttals is more
complicated, however, as their rebuttals at best rely on a guess on whether the
experience was a result of a collusion or an attempt to get lucky. The number
of third-party rebuttals processed from any actor at a given timeframe can be
limited to control the load. A minor reward for a competing service provider is
that the artificially inflated reputation of its competitor is reduced, increasing its
own reputation in relation to it. A greater incentive can be created by providing
a reputation reward for a successful third-party rebuttal, although this in turn
must be combined with limitations on the frequency of such rebuttals in order
to not create an incentive to flood the reputation system with random rebuttals.
In addition, the reputation gains of third-party rebutters should not be as high
as the reputation loss of the other actor, as this would create a market for
moving reputation from the source to the rebutter. Finally, actors with very
bad reputation cannot be reasonably incentivized to behave through threats of
further reputation loss, and should therefore be eventually shut out of submitting
new information or third-party rebuttals to the reputation system.
Even when a third-party rebuttal is ineffective in the objective sense, dis-
seminating the rebuttal attempt allows reputation system participants trusting
the whistleblower more than the source and target together to adjust their lo-
cal credibility analysis accordingly. These kinds of side effects are an argument
for distributing information about the rebuttals to the entire reputation system
even if a centralized system could perform the analysis itself.
4.2 Addressing collusion to generate positive experiences
As collaborations in the open service ecosystem are impossible to externally
observe by third parties unless the collaborating parties allow it, it is possible
for two participants to collude to produce positive experiences on each other. To
do this, they exchange nonrepudiable receipts according to a protocol, without
actually committing concrete resources. They can include an honest notary to
observe the exchange and gain further credibility, assuming that the business
process does not require costly third-party services to be invoked. Limiting the
attractiveness of collusion is a difficult problem. The victim of conducting fake
business may also be unobvious: how can positive feedback be harmful?
Let us assume that in a competitive environment, having a higher number
of positive experience reports stored on an actor directly influences their prob-
ability of being chosen into a collaboration. This, in turn, provides additional
opportunities in gaining further positive reputation. The assumption implies that
a relative loss of reputation in comparison to one’s competitors translates to a
monetary loss that is slowly growing over time. Punishment for unfairly caus-
ing reputation loss to a victim is intuitively important. When we also consider
that within this assumption, a relative gain in reputation in comparison to one’s
competitors is similar to causing all of them reputation loss, the problem with
ballot stuffing in reputation systems becomes acute.
Li et al. propose to solve the issue by assigning a cost to all transactions,
which would increase the cost of collusion [11]. For the operational environment
12
of Pilarcos, however, there is no clear single operator who could collect equal
transaction-based fees from all members of the ecosystem, and allowing actors
to choose the target of their payments would leave an opening for a more complex
collusion that includes a dishonest operator service.
We must therefore resolve this issue within the domain of distributed peer
control, and propose to do so by partially breaking the above assumption: posi-
tive experiences should not directly improve the probability of being chosen, but
positive experiences that are locally found credible would have this effect. Neg-
ative experiences should generally have more weight in a decision than positive
experiences, and they, in turn, must be backed by evidence.
By valuing local and possibly trusted partners’ experiences above random
shared experiences, the ecosystem members can limit the gains from collusion
between isolated actors; we discuss a selection of different approaches to esti-
mating the credibility of reputation information in earlier work [18, 23]. Local
credibility analysis based on e.g. social relations with the information source [4]
or the relationship with local experiences [21] is subjective and therefore should
only be used to select trustworthy and relevant information sources. It cannot
form a basis for second-order punishment, as the reason for a disagreement be-
tween two experience sources can be caused by honestly reported discriminatory
behaviour.
4.3 Comparison to the state of the art
To demarcate our contribution to the state of the art, we compare our solu-
tion within Pilarcos to the protocol-based solution proposed by Li et al. [11] on
five dimensions: application area, type of third party witness, target of observa-
tion, punishment method and implementation requirements. A summary of the
comparison is provided in Table 1.
In application area, the proposals differ on two levels. Pilarcos operates in a
governed open service ecosystem, where transactions are complex and may be
long-lived, and varying communication protocols are defined through collabora-
tion contracts. In the proposal of Li et al., the electronic marketplace supports
exchanges of goods in simple transactions, and the same protocol suffices for all
actors. A more complex environment also means that our view of misbehaviour
must be broader, and as a result Li et al.’s theorem on removing actors’ incentive
to misbehave [11] does not generalize meaningfully into open service ecosystems.
Third party observation is implemented in Pilarcos through a notary who
acts as a passive witness: it signs receipts, but does not act on them. In con-
trast, Li et al. have an active arbitrator who is also responsible for judging the
outcome and punishing misbehaviour, which gives it more power. Despite this
difference, the same impacts [11] and basic limitations of third party protocol-
level monitoring apply to both solutions: only protocol-level misbehaviour can be
detected through protocol-level monitoring, which means that e.g. compensation
processes must be made visible on that level to have a reputation impact.
The target of observation in both proposals is the accurate completion of pro-
tocols; in Pilarcos they follow contract-defined business processes, while for Li et
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Table 1. Comparison of Pilarcos to the proposal of Li et al.
al. there is a fixed protocol for purchasing arbitrable and replicatable goods [11].
We therefore consider our solution to be a generalization of their work. Li et
al. define arbitrability and replicatability, i.e. that the communication protocol
can be repeated for the third-party witness, as requirements for arbitration be
effective [11]. We expect that reasonable arbitrability can be reached through
business process design for open service ecosystems as well; in some situations,
additional third party mediators must be involved to control risks in the collab-
oration. For particularly trusted partners, these controls can be relaxed.
The punishment methods of the systems differ in focus and approach. The
reputation-based punishment we propose in this paper is distributed and based
on peer control. In addition to reputation-based punishment, Pilarcos contracts
contain compensation clauses for misbehaviour, like any business agreements.
Li et al. take a centralized point of view both in the arbitrator-based monetary
punishment and optionally the broker selecting providers based on their rep-
utation, which is also determined centrally. The approaches seem to be more
complementary than contradictory; for example deposits can be applied in high-
risk situations to ensure that contractual compensation can be enforced, and
reputation-based service selection can be distributed to the actors themselves.
We aim for a distributed solution to ensure the viability of the marketplace: as
reputation information is worth money, granting a single central actor monopoly
over all ecosystem members’ reputation is equivalent to creating a new central
bank in the ecosystem; this kind of power is disruptive and requires strong con-
trol mechanisms to balance for it.
The implementation requirements of the two solutions are different in nature.
In the proposal of Li et al., the availability of the trusted arbitrator as well as
deposit bank and broker is required, and the service fees must be configured
globally to minimize incentives to misbehave while maintaining an incentive to
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use the system. In addition, all actors are required to make bank-controlled
deposits which are held as collateral. The trusted third parties form a single
point of failure to the marketplace, which Li et al. aim to distribute more in
future work [11].
For Pilarcos, we require the existence of trusted notaries, and push the re-
quirement for designing appropriate arbitrable protocols to specialist business
network model designers. In addition, we demand that users of the proposed
reputation system, where shared experience information is stored, agree to the
reputation network contract. Other costs and impacts of the encompassing Pi-
larcos system and its trust management system have been discussed in earlier
work [17]; we draw additional benefits from the infrastructure for the goal at
hand. In contrast to the proposal by Li et al., we estimate that centrally col-
lected global service fees for all transactions are unrealistic in the open service
ecosystem, which means that they cannot be generally applied to solve the bal-
lot stuffing problem. Instead, we propose the use of local credibility estimation
to reduce the gains from such collusion. This credibility analysis can take into
consideration the cost of faking the transaction as well, for example if there is
an equivalent of service fees designed into the specific business process.
For implementation cost, the increased messaging for applying third party
witnesses to problem situations is not a major cost when optimistic fair exchange
protocols are used [13]. The runtime overhead of either system is dominated by
cryptographic signing, and we estimate it is not remarkable, considering that
the systems involved are capable of running full-blown business protocols.
In summary, our proposed solution is designed for a complex environment;
we find that some of the impact of third party witnesses discussed by Li et al.
hold for Pilarcos and give implications for collaboration protocol design, while
other assumptions made in their game-theoretic analysis [11] cannot hold due to
differences in collaboration types. Some aspects of the bank-based punishment
proposed by Li et al. are best compared to contractual compensation in the Pi-
larcos context, and a system for contractually-agreed, deposit-based punishment
could well coexist with reputation-based punishment for misbehaviour. Our pro-
posal is distributed and reduces the amount of trust that must be placed on the
third party witness or other involved actors.
5 Conclusion
We advance a reputation system for inter-enterprise collaborations that is based
on objective, verifiable reputation: shared experiences denote whether the col-
laboration contract was followed or not. To standardize the semantics of ex-
periences in order to make them shareable, we define the reputation effects of
different kinds of collaborations in the collaboration contracts. To ensure that
false experiences are caught and their submitters punished, an audit trail of
the collaboration is produced by signed, nonrepudiable receipts. These receipts
can be used to verify whether an experience report is truthful. Objectivity and
verifiability go hand in hand: alone, the impact of either remains limited.
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The major benefit from this combined approach is the implementation of
a two-level sanctioning system, punishing both malicious behaviour and unfair
punishments. In the absence of a strong centralized control mechanism, this is
necessary to ensure that the service ecosystem does not deteriorate from rampant
misbehaviour. In other words, we implement a distributed form of social control
in the open service ecosystem.
Trust issues are not entirely solvable by technology alone; in our approach,
as well, the final recourse involves lawsuits for contract breaches, and similar
infrastructure for ensuring that notaries, i.e. trusted third parties, have an in-
centive to fulfil their duties. In contrast to the default assumption that trusted
third parties are universally trusted, we have strongly limited the amount of
trust necessary to place on the proposed notary services.
Objective and verifiable experiences make it possible to punish the spreading
of misinformation in the reputation system; due to factors such as collusion to
produce positive experiences with little invested effort, they do not remove the
need to analyse reputation information locally. Local credibility analysis of all
incoming experiences remains a central technical recourse against misinforma-
tion: it is not necessary nor prudent to accept all experiences as equal, be they
subjective or objective.
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